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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

· STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD E. 'VATKINS

Plaintiff and Appellant
-vs.-

Case No. 777 4

UTAH POULTRY AND Fl\.RMERS
COOPERATIYE, a Corporation

Defendant and Respondent

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
A jury with all of the evidence before them, including the injuries which plaintiff has taken pains to call
to the court's attention and with an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, decided the issues
of fact in the present case in defendant's favor. Our
inquiry at this time should not be to search out that evidence which might sustain the plaintiff's theory, as plaintiff has so artfully done in his brief, but to determine if
there is sufficient evidence upon which the jury might
reasonably have found as they did.
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In that part of his brief having to do with the issues
of fact, plaintiff argues that there was no evidence that
intoxication was a proximate or contributing cause of the
collision. The great preponderance of the evidence sustains the conclusion that plaintiff's intoxication was the
proximate cause of the collision. It should be pointed out,
however, that the issue of plaintiff's negligence should
not be so limited. Plaintiff alleged in his con1plaint that
"the defendant recklessly, carelessly and negligently
drove its heavily loaded international truck against the
left front end of plaintiff's car," (R. 1) and that the injuries to the plaintiff occurred as a result of this negligence. Defendant denies that "this defendant or said
Matherson (defendant's driver) was negligent as alleged therein or negligent in any manner whatsoever."
And alleges "that said accident was solely caused, or the
cause thereof was proximately contributed to by the
negligent acts, conduct and omissions of the plaintiffs."
(R. 3-4) Therefore, the issues of fact in this case are not
limited to whether or not the intoxication of the plaintiff
was a proximate or contributing cause of the accident but
are whether a jury might reasonably find from the evidence that there was no negligent conduct on the part
of the defendant which was a proximate cause of any
injury to the plaintiff or, the jury having found that
there was such negligence, whether they, as reasonable
men, might also have found that the injuries to the plaintiff were proximately contributed to by the negligent acts,
conduct and omissions of the plaintiff himself.
F·or convenience, we will follow the same breakdown
2
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a~

the plaintiff in di~eu~~ing the evidence and will fin.;t
di~eus~ the evidence pertaining to the intoxieation of the
plaintiff and then the evidence pertaining to the proximate cau~e of the autmnobile collision out of which this
action arose.
~T~\TE~LENT

A.

OF FACTS

Evidence pertaining to intoxication.

The behavior and condition of the plaintiff was
first observed by :Jir. Jack Scott as the plaintiff entered
~Ir. Scott's store in Cedar City at about 5 :30 in the afternoon of the day of the accident. Mr. Scott testified
that ··he was intoxicated, very much so ... he was untidy
in his appearance, his clothing. His eyes were quite
bloodshot, his tongue was thick, his conversation was a
gablous character, and he couldn't hardly hold himself
up." (R. 126-127) After a short conversation (R. 128)·
~Ir. Scott found it necessary to help plaintiff to the door
and out of his store because he was annoying a boy who
worked for :Jir. Scott. (R. 129)
A short time later, l\Ir. Scott encountered the plaintiff for a second time. This time on the street in front
of his store about three or four doors south of his establishment. Mr. Scott was engaged in a conversation
with a l\Ir. Tuckett and a Mr. Christensen when the plaintiff approached the group and directed the remark "Hi
stupid" toward them. (R. 131-135) Mr. Tuckett, who
most closely observed the plaintiff at this time, stated
that he told :Mr. Watkins, the plaintiff, to go get lost.
At that point plaintiff raised the "22" calibre rifle he was
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carrying and pointed it toward the three conversants.
Mr. Tuckett told him "he would look silly as hell with
that gun sticking out of his body" (R. 135) whereupon, as
testified by Mr. Tuckett, plaintiff "staggered over to his
automobile on the south side of the car, and he then
reached into the window of his car and pulled the window
up, and stuck the rifle out, pulled the bolt back, raised
the gun up at the three of us, the backs of Mr. Scott and
Mr. Seegmiller, and toward my face." The group separated at that time. ·(R. 132-135)
Mr. Layron Christensen, the manager of Reed's
Riteway store, whose premises adjoin those of Mr.
Seott's, testified that plaintiff was in his establishment at
about 5 :30 p.m. the same afternoon and offered to sell
Mr. Christensen a gun. This witness stated that plaintiff
appeared wobbly and talked in jerks and that the plaintiff stated to him "well I am drunk, but don't think I am
proud of it." "I am really ashamed. I am just having
a good time." (R. 137)
One hour later, approximately 6 :30 p.m., plaintiff
entered "Ted's Bar" in Cedar City. The proprietor,
Mr. Kent Farnsworth, a witness for the defendant, on
cross examination testified as follows concerning plaintiff's condition at that time: "As he came in the door he
straightened up. Sat down and ordered a beer. Then
after he ordered the beer I could see he was incapacitated
because the minute he went to get it he tipped it over,
and I wouldn't sell him any more" . . . "After he tipped
the beer over he was in no condition for another glass
of beer." (R. 140) Plaintiff had been in Ted's Bar earlier
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in the day and Farnsworth had told hiln at that tin1e to
go back to St. George because he would only get in
trouble. (R. 139) ~Ir. Farnsworth finally escorted plaintiff out of his establishn1ent because of his unruly conduet. ( R. 139)
Between S :00 and S :30 p.m. plaintiff. was in Milt's
Circus Lounge, as testified to by l\Irs. Orissa Hirshi,
the bartender. He had been in the lounge earlier in the
day and .Jirs. Hirshi had been warned by her brother
not to sell him any beer. (R. 143) 1\frs. Hirshi stated
that the plaintiff was insulting and had been drinking.
(R. 143) A short conversation followed Mrs. Hirshi's
refusal to sell plaintiff any more beer. (R. 144) -Mr.
Robert E. Cooley, a patron, who entered the establishment at the same tiine as the plaintiff, stated to Mrs.
Hirshi, "This fellow had had too much to drink," and
offered to summon the police. (R. 144) Thereafter,
police officer "\Villiam Hills arrived and took plaintiff
into his custody. (R. 164) Mr. CooJey watched plaintiff
leave with officer Hills and stated that the plaintiff staggered as he walked up the stairs to the street entrance
(R. 164)
Officer William Hills of the Cedar City Police testified he first noticed the plaintiff as he entered the Circus
Lounge in response to Mr. Cooley's call and saw the
plaintiff leaning heavily on the bar, face flushed and his
eyes quite glassy and with the appearance of being intoxicated. (R. 150) Officer Hills requested Mr. Watkins
to follow him outside which the plaintiff did, although,
the officer had to help him up the stairs to the street because of plaintiff's wobbly condition. (R. 151) Once out5
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side both men entered the police car. As officer Hills
backed away from the curb he remarked to plaintiff,
"Well, pal, it looks like you have got kind of a pretty good
load on." The plaintiff replied, "Yes, I have been drinking." (R. 151) Officer Hills drove the police car around
Cedar City for a short time and then drove to plaintiff's car and informed him that he would not book him
if he would not drive the car. Mr. Watkins promised not
to drive and stated that he was waiting for another man
who had the keys to the car and who would drive. (R.
153) Plaintiff stated, "Oh, I know you are giving me a
break ... and you could probably book me with justification." (R. 153-154) Officer Hills left the plaintiff in his
automobile sitting on the right hand side of the driver's
seat. The officer waited a few minutes and responded
to another call. When he returned between 8 :57 and 9 :24
o'clock p.m., at the most 33 minutes. before the accident
occurred at a point 32 miles distant, the plaintiff was still
sitting in his vehicle as the officer had left him. (R. 171)
The officer's testimony as to the time was verified by the
radio log. (Exhibits 1 and 2)
Ernest Pearce, a state highway patrolman who assisted in the investigation of this accident, testified that
when he arrived at the scene of the accident, shortly
after 10:00 o'clock p.m., and about an hour after the accident, the plaintiff was still lying on the seat of his car
"profaning in a belligerent state of mind." (R. 203) It
was his opinion from his observation of the plaintiff that
he was intoxicated. (R. 206)
Thomas H. Semmons, the highway patrolman who
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in eharg-e of the inye~tigation, who incidentally was
called a~ a witne~s hy the defendant and not the plaintiff,
te~tified that he could smell the odor of liquor aboLlt
plaintiff's car and that in his opinion the plaintiff was
under the influence of liquor at the time.
Dr. Broadbent, the doctor who treated the plaintiff
at the Iron County Hospital at about 11 :30 o'clock the
night of the accident, testified that the plaintiff was antagonistic, objected to treatment and was very abusive in
his language (R. 289). While he admitted that there
were some elements of plaintiff's injury which possibly
could have explained the plaintiff's behavior (R. 297),
it \Ya~ the opinion of this witness, specially train'ed to
diagnose the physical condition of persons, that the plaintiff was intoxicated. (R. 291) The following morning,
plaintiff apologized to the doctor for his conduct and
'"said he was sorry for the way he had acted because when
he drank he wasn't exactly responsible." (R. 290)
Phyllis Nelson, the nurse at the Iron County Hospital who assisted Dr. Broadbent, testified that the first
thing she noticed about the patient, plaintiff, was the
smell of liquor about him (R: 352) and that "he was
profaning . . . he was belligeTent and uncooperative in
every way. His language was ... well, it isn't what we
would expect from a patient in the hospital in his condition." (R. 353) Her opinion was that he was under the
influence of liquor. (R. 354) The following morning the
plaintiff asked if he had given them a hard time during
the night and said, "If I did, I am sorry, because I was
clrinking. I had been drinking." (R. 355)

7
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B. Evidence pertaining to the proximate cause of the
accident.
By their verdict in favor of the defendant, the jury
must necessarily have decided either that the defendant
had not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence
to have been guilty of any negligence which was the
proximate cause of the collision or, if they did believe
defendant was guilty of such negligence, then the plaintiff was also guilty of some negligent conduct which was
a proximate cause of his own injuries. Let us examine
the record to determine if they might have reasonably so
found.
There is little, if any, evidence of any negligence on
the part of the defendant. Plaintiff testified that the defendant's truck appeared to be overlapping his side of the
highway as the two vehicles approached the point of collision near a bridge about seven miles north of Paragona,
·Utah on US Highway 91 from opposite directions. (R.
60) Highway Patrolman, Ernest Pierce, testified that
the tire marks left by plaintiff's vehicle started about
10 to 20 feet north of the bridge (R. 32) and that they
swung across the road and back and then way over." (R.
33) Exhibit G was received for the limited purpose offerred, that was, merely to illustrate the officer's testimony as to the beginning of the alleged tire marks, and
for no other purpose. (R. 39) Officer Pierce admitted
that he didn't make any extensive investigation in the
area north of the bridge by reason of the fact that he
and State Trooper 'Semmons had already conCluded that
the point of impact was south of the bridge; (R. 43) and,
8
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for the further reason, that Officer . Se1n1nons was the
principal inYestigating officer and that he was merely
assisting by regulating traffic and holding the measuring
tape. (R. 364) He testified that he was dissatisfied with
the investigation 1nade on the night of the accident and
suggested to Officer Sem1nons that he go out the next
morning, "and n1aybe he could find more definite about
where they hit." (R. -!2-36-!) Theodore Atherly, another
witness for plaintiff, testified that he observed these tire
marks starting about four feet east of the center line
and continuing to the plaintiff's car. (R. 114) He further
testified that he observed two fresh gouge marks on the
·highway west of the center or on the defendant's side of
the road. (R. 362)
Contrast this evidence of negligence on the part of
the defendant with that on the part of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff had a history of being drunk from five o'clock
on the afternoon, four and one-half hours before the
accident at 9 :30 p.m. (R. 1) to 11 :30 that night. Plaintiff
testified that after he observed the lights of the approaching truck east of the center line or on his side of
the road, he continued to drive toward those lights for
some distance without making any attempt to stop his
vehicle except to slightly touch the brakes with his foot
when he saw the bridge. (R. 108) LaMar W. Matheson,
the driver of the defendant's automobile, testified that
the overall length of the truck was 23 feet 6 inches and
that the truck measured 94 inches in over-all width. (R.
218) The truck had amber clearance lights on both corners of the bed (R. 219) and all lights were burning when
9
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the truck made its last stop at Beaver, Utah. (R. 220)
He stated that the speed of the truck as it approached
the bridge where the collision occurred was between 45
and 50 miles an hour, (R. 220) and that he was traveling
on the west side of the highway. (R. 221) He first noticed
the lights of the plaintiff's automobile approximately
two miles away and observed that they were approaching
him much faster than the other traffic on the highway.
(R. 221) At the time the plaintiff's automobile passed the
cab of the truck the right wheels of the truck were on the
west edge of the hard surface. (R. 221-222) The only
warning he had of the impending collision was just a
moment· before the impact when the plaintiff's automobile seemed to come toward him or to turn toward the
truck. (R. 229) Matheson brought the truck to a stop
about 200 feet south of the point of collision and then
drove the truck another hundred feet forward to get it
completely off of the highway. (R. 222) As he walked
back along the highway to the point where plaintiff's
car had come to rest, he observed the jack and tools of
the truck just about half way in the west lane of the
highway, close to the north side of the bridge. (R. 223)
(The location of the jack is marked "K" with a circle.
around it on the diagram drawn on the board labeled
P.A.J.) This was a twelve ton hydraulic jack weighing
about 25 pounds, (R. 223) which had been in the tool box
under the left front corner of the truck bed prior to the
accident. (R. 224) The tool box was broken and scattered
about the road. (R. 224) It is reasonable to assume that
the box was broken by the impact of the two cars and the
10
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heayy jack cmne to re~t on the highway smnewhere near
the point of i1npact.
The passeng·er in defendant's automobile, Glen Garfield, had aerial gunnery training in the anny and qualified as an expert in aerial fire which required that he
be able to judge the relative speeds of different objects.
(R. 175) He testified defendant's truck was traveling
south approxi1nately 45 miles per hour (R. 176), and the
speed of the approaching car "appeared to be consider-.
ably faster because you noticed in the distance it was
coming at a very rapid rate. You can't tell how fast, but
you just know, from watching any car coming out on the
open highway, that it is coming at a high rate of speed.
T~at is, as far as judging, you know it is cmning fast if
the distance between you clo~es very rapidly." (R. 176)
He testified he was watching the side of the highway and
it appeared to him the truck was almost off the oiled
surface of the road and that the truck continued to travel
near the very edge of the highway up until the time of
impact. (R. 177)
On the night of the accident the officers determined
the point of impact to be a raspberry smear south of the
bridge. (R. 41) Mr. Garfield and Mr. Matheson had
procured six cases of raspberries in Orem, Utah, which
were being carried in the tool box. When the tool box
was shattered by the impact, the berries were apparently
scattered all over the highway. (R. 184). The raspberry
smear extended south from the bridge and was predominantly on the west side of the road. (R. 279) The
center of the smear was 65 feet south of the bridge and
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seven feet ten inches from the west shoulder of the hard
surface of the highway and eleven feet ten inches ftom
the east shoulder. (R. 306) The morning following the
accident the investigating officer, Thomas H. Semmons,
returned to the scene of the collision and re-examined
the marks on the highway. At that time he found two
gouge marks on the west side of the highway. He testified the most southerly gouge marks were two feet from
the center of the road on the west side about five to seven
feet north of the bridge. (R. 307) It was roughly about
two inches across and four inches long and about an inch
and a half to two inches deep. (R. 307) The second
gouge mark was a foot and a half north and about six
inches east of the first gouge mark still on the west
side of the road. (R. 308) There were tire marks in the
vicinity of the gouge marks which the officer took to be
the left side of the Ford. These marks continued in a
straight line out from these two gouge 1narks in a northeasterly direction commencing in the center of the road.
They then crossed over to the east and followed the
course testified to by Officer Pearce. The officer identified point 1 on Exhibit 2 as the southerly most gouge
mark, point 2 on Exhibit 2 as the next gouge mark and
point 3 as the beginning of the tire marks. (R. 338) William C. Dalton, who accompanied Deputy Sheriff Arch
Benson, to the scene of the accident, (R. 244) follo:wed
the course of plaintiff's Ford car back from the place
where it came to rest down along the tire marks :which
zig zagged across the highway to two gouge marks on the
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west side of the road. (R. :2-lS) (See photograph of diagram on board labeled "Dalton.")
Sheriff ~\rthur Nielson of Iron County placed these
gouge 1narks six or seyen feet north of the bridge (R.
:2G-!) and a couple of feet west of the center. (R. 265)
He did not locate the tire 1narks 1nade by what he assun1ed
was the left wheel of the Ford automobile for about
four or five feet frmn the gouges, but he was able to locate what he considered the right wheel marks four or
five feet east of the center line. (R. 267)
There can be little doubt but that the actual point
of impact was in the immediate vicinity of the gouge
marks six or seven feet north of the bridge and two feet
over on the west or defendant's side of the highway.
The plaintiff himself puts the point of impact in the
immediate vicinity of the bridge. (R. 60-61, R. 81) The
passenger in the defendant's automobile, Glen Garfield,
from his own observations at the time of the collision
fixed the point of impact as just north of the bridge.
(R. 200) The driver of the truck, Matheson, testified
that the truck was in the close vicinity of the west bridge
abutment at the time of the impact. (R. 221-222)
Claude E. Burton, a garage owner from Parowan,
Utah, called to the scene of the accident with his wrecker,
(R. 257) testified that when he towed plaintiff's car in
that night, there was no tire on the left front wheel rim.
(R. 262) He returned the next morning and picked up
the tire which had come off the broken rim. "The tire
was blowed out, or it had a gouge in it, a big hole in the
tire and tube ... Oh, I would say from three to four
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inches approximately. 1 didn't measure it." (R. 259)
Glen Garfield testified he noted what appeared to be part
of a fender of plaintiff's vehicle was stuck in the left
corner of the truck bed, (R. 182) and that a piece of tire
was imbedded between the tire and the rim of the left
rear dual wheel on the truck. (R. 182) Matheson also
observed a piece of tire imbedded between the bead of the
truck tire and the rim of the left rear wheel. (R. 221)
The investigating officer, Semmons, testified that
the picture, Exh~bit F, depicted the damage to the truck
and that he noted scrapping marks on the tire and his
attention was called to a piece of rubber wedged in the
rim of the outside left tire. (R. 272)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. I
THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF.

POINT NO. II
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INTOXICATION WAS
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS AN ELEMENT
OF PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE.

POINT NO. III
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE.

POINT NO. IV
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE EVIDENCK
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_-\RGUMENT
POINT NO.1
THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF.
~-\s

was pointed out at the outset, the ultimate issue
of fact in this case was not whether plaintiff's intoxication was a proximate cause of the collision. Intoxication was merely one of the elements which the jury might
have considered in determining the ultimate question of
negligence.
A lTtah case which bears striking similarity to the
case at bar is nioser v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile
Institution, 114 Utah 58, 197 P2d 136. Two vehicles approached each other on U.S. 91 approximately one and
a half 1niles south of Logan, Utah. The accident occurred
66 feet south of the bridge. The issue was stated by the
.court as follows on page 67 of the Utah Report:
"The ultilnate question of fact in this case is, of
course, which of the two drivers failed to keep his vehicle
on the proper side of the road." .The court held :
"The determination of this ultimate fact was
for the jury. And the jury having determined
this question in plaintiff's favor, and the trial
court having denied defendant's motion for new
trial, this court cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion unless there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict, or in
other words, that all reasonable minds must agree
that it was plaintiff, and not defendant, Rogers,
who transgressed the center line of the highway."
"The testimony of plaintiff, corroborated by
the passengers in his automobile, is sufficient

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

basis for the jury's verdict, unless that testimony is contrary to admitted physical facts."
In this case, one of the ultimate questions of fact
for the jury was: Which vehicle crossed the center line
of the highway~ The jury determined that issue in favor
of the defendant and the testimony of the passengers
in defendant's automobile, and the physical facts support that determination.
Mr. Matheson, driver of the defendant's truck, and
Mr. Garfield, his passenger, testified the truck was as
near the west edge of the oiled surface of the highway
as possible without actually being on the shoulder. (R.
177-222} The speed of the truck was not excessive, being
45 to 50 miles per hour. (R. 176-220} The automobile
of plaintiff approached the truck in an apparently normal
manner (R. 176-221} except for its relative speed which
was considerably faster than the defendant's truck was
traveling.
The physical facts consist of the debris left by the
collision and the path of the Watkins vehicle from the two
rim gouges at the point of impact. Three witnesses testified that they observed two gouge marks approximately
five to s.even feet north of the bridge and about one and
a half to two feet west of the center of the highway.
Mr. Dalton stated that the path left by the tires of plaintiff's vehicle could be easily traced from the gouge marks
to where the vehicle came to rest. (R. 252} Sheriff N~lson
testified that the gouge marks were as Mr. Dalton placed
them in his diagram and appeared to have been freshly
made. (R. 265} Patrolman Semmons closely examined
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the gouge n1arks and described the first and most south.:
erly one as being about an inch to two inches deep and
about two inches wide with a smooth interior (R; 307),
and the second gouge Inark to the north as being longer
and more jagged and sharply dipped at its southe-rn
extremity and sloping out as it ran north. (R. 313) This
is not the Ina.rk of a piece of the debris from the wreck
or a tool frmn the truck being pressed into the highway
by passing vehicle as plaintiff contends, but rathe-r shows
the sharp impact of an object in forward motion.
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the left front
tire of the Ford was not thrown until just before- the
vehicle came to rest, the gouges could not have been made
by the rim of the vehicle. However, Mr. Burton testified
that a piece of the tire and tube had been gouged out of
the side and bottom of the tire (R. 261), and several witnesses observed a piece of tire was embedded between
the rim and tire of the left rear dual wheel of the truck,
indicating that when the. car hit the left front corner of
the truck bed, the tremendous force of the impact caused
the left front wheel of the car to go underneath the bed
and forced the wheel rim through the tire and into the
surface of the highway making the gouge marks. After ·
the car had passed underneath the truck bed, its rolling
motion caused the tire to go back on the rim, hence the
tire marks commencing a few feet north of the gouge
marks.
The oiled portion of the highway at the point of impact is approximately 19 feet wide. (R. 311) The bed
of the truck is 94 inches wide. The truck was traveling
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with its wheels on the edge of the oiled portion. This
would place the left corner of the truck bed approximately one and a half feet from the center of the road.
The testimony showed the gouge 1narks were approximately that distance from the center of the highway.
Plaintiff places great stress upon the tire burns pictured in Exhibit "G." Both 'Sheriff Nelson and Patrolman Semmons testified in rebuttal that Exhibit "G" does
not accurately depict the path of plaintiff's vehicle. (R.
269-327).
The weight of the evidence clearly shows plaintiff'~
vehicle was traveling to the left of the center of the
highway. The jury had an extensive and plausible basis
for its determination as to who was traveling to the left
of the center of the highway.
The courts which have passed upon the question
presented by this appeal have followed the rule announced in the Moser case, cited above. In the case of Hellwig
v. Lomeliono, 33 N.E. 2nd 174 (Ill.), the collision occurred between two approaching vehicles on a bridge. The
court held the question of negligence was a question of
fact for the jury. The plaintiff received a verdict below
and the defendant contended contributory negligence
should have been found by the jury. The court pointed
out the verdict of the jury would not be disturbed on
appeal unless the evidence was so clearly insufficient
to establish due care that all reasonable minds must
conclude that there was contributory negligence.
In Ward v. Martin, 147 S.W. 2nd 1027 (Ky.), the
collision occurred between two approaching vehicles.

18
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Both partie8 clai1ned they were traveling to the right of
the center of the highway. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. The court held the question of who
\nl.s traYeling to the left of the center is a question of fact
for the jury and their determination would not be ~et
a8ide on the appeal.
In Brown v. \Yyoming Butane Gas Company, 205
P2d 116 (\Yyo.), an accident occurred on a bridge between two gasoline tankers traveling in opposite directions. Both parties contended the other was on the left
or wrong side of the road. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. The Court held:
"There was other conflicting evidence upon
the location of these units when the collision occurred, but sufficient has been recited to indicate
that it was the duty of the jury to resolve th~se
contradictions and under the rules of law mentioned above we are necessarily bound in this
Court hy its conclusions."
Plaintiff argues that there was insufficient evidence
on which the jury might reasonably predicate a finding
that the intoxication of plaintiff was a proximate result
of the collision. In support of this proposition he cites
the case of Fleming v. McMillan, 26 S.E. 2nd 8 (W.Va.)
where the only evidence of intoxication was that various
witnesses smelled liquor on his breath. Otherwise, there
was nothing unusual in the conduct or conversation of
defendant indicating intoxication. In another case cited,
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 247 P. 909, the only evidence of intoxication was that an officer observed a considerable odor of liquor on defendant's breath three
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hours after the accident. Moreover, that case involved
a criminal charge where a different burden of proof exists ; that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In Rogers
v. Silverfleet System of Memphis, 180 S. 445 (La.), cited
on page 26 of plaintiff's brief, the only evidence of intoxication was that Rogers, the plaintiff, drank a glass
of beer and may have been drinking four or five hours
before the accident.
While the jury need not have found intoxication to
be a proximate cause of this ac~ident in order to decide
this case as they did, they might have reasonably so
found from the evidence. We have a record of plaintiff's
intoxicated condition from the time the defendant was
first observed by Mr. Jack Scott at about 5 :00 o'clock
p.m. on the day of the collision. (R. 127) From that
time on a succession of witnesses testified to the intoxication of the plaintiff. Mr. Christenson observed plaintiff
at about the same time as Mr. Scott and testified plaintiff was drunk and plain tiff admitted to him that he was
drunk. (R. 137) Plaintiff had been in Ted's Bar earlier
in the day. He returned about 6 :30 p.m. Mr. Farnsworth,
the proprietor, stated he sold plaintiff a beer which
plaintiff tipped over and Mr. Farnsworth saw he was in
no condition for more beer. (R. 140) Plaintiff was in
Milt's Circus Bar between 8 :00 and 8 :30 p.m. Mrs. Hirshi
stated plaintiff was insulting and had been drinking.
(R. 143) Mr. Cooley made the statement that at that time
plaintiff had had too much to drink. (R. 144) Mr. Hills
testified plaintiff had the appearance of being intoxic~lted, (R. 150) an'd outside the 'tavern in the officers
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car plaintiff adJnitted he had been drinking. (R. 151)
The accident occurred shortly after the officer left plaintiff in hi~ car at. Cedar City. (R. 167-R. 1) Officer Semnwns who eonducted the 1najor part of the investigation
stated in his opinion the plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicating liquor when he observed him after
the accident. Both Dr. Broadbent (R. 291) and nurse
Xel~on, (R. 35±) stated plaintiff was intoxicated and the
following morning plaintiff adJnitted to them he had been
drinking. (R. 290 R. 355)
Plaintiff contends that the fact that plaintiff's automobile approached defendant's automobile in a normal
manner except for the speed of the automobile shows
the sobriety of the plaintiff. The logical extension of that
argun1ent is that every vehicle which is being propelled by
a drunken driver must necessarily show some marked
aberration. Such is not the case. The fact merely shows
l\fr. \Vatkins did not change the course of his vehicle up
to the time of impact even though under his own testimony a collision appeared imminent. He claimed that he
observed defendant's truck approaching his automobile
partially on his side of the road for some distance but he
took no action to avoid a collision other than to touch his
brakes slightly. This action is illustrative of the conduct
which might be expected from an individual in a drunken
stuper rather than the conduct one would expect from
an alert individual conscious of the impending danger.
Intoxication, in and of itself, is not the immediate direct cause of any accident. But it is a matter of common
knowledge that persons in an intoxicated condition are
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not competent to drive automobiles because of their impaired physical condition. They lack the power of observation, judgment, and ability to cope with the conditions which are likely to be encountered upon the highway. It is the acts or omissions of persons in the impaired condition caused by the intoxication which directly
causes automobile accidents.
In this case the defendant drove his automobile from
Cedar City to the point of the collision in at most, 33 minutes since Officer Hill's testimony, verified by the radio
log, places him in Cedar City between 8:57p.m. and 9:24
p.m., and the accident happened at a point some 32 miles
distance at 9:30 p.m. In order to cover that distance in
33 minutes, plaintiff must necessarily have averaged 60
miles per hour. If allowance is made for time lost slowing for other traffic and curves in the road, it becomes
evident that plaintiff was exceeding 60 MPH on straight
stretches of highway. He approached the automobile
of the defendant at a high rate of speed. Under his
own testimony he failed to do anything whatsoever to
avoid the acc:i'dent even though he had an opportunity to
do so and the great preponderance of the evidence shows
he either drove his automobile onto the west or wrong
side of the highway into and against the automobile of
the defendant or lost control of i't with the same result.
It is submitted that there was ample evidence from which
the jury might reasonably have found as it did that the
negligent conduct of the plaintiff, as aforesaid, was the
sole or proximate cause of his own injuries.
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POINT NO. II
EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF'S INTOXICATION WAS
'20PERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AS AN ELEMENT
·1 F PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE.
~-\s

has been pointed out, there was sufficient evidence frmn which the jury might reasonably ha.ve coneluded the intoxication of the plaintiff was a proxi1nate
cause of the accident. This being the case, it was proper
for the court to submit this issue to the jury as the court
did in his instruction No. 5, which instruction we will
have occasion to deal with in greater detail later.
In Western States Grocery Company et al v. Mirt, 12~~
P 2d 267, (Okla.). a collision occurred between two vehicles approaching each other. Defendant requested that
the court give an instruction on intoxicating liquor. The
court refused to give an instruction which read as follows:
'"You are instructed that under the testilnony
the defendants have plead as one of their defenses
of (Sic) contributory negligence, that is to say,
that the plaintiff, Roy ~1irt, was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of this aceident."
"You are instructed that under the phrase
·1mder the influenee of intoxieating liquor' means
that if intoxicating liquor has so far affected the
nervous system or the brains or museles that wil1
tend to impair the abilitY of one to operate an
automobile in the manner of an ordinarily eautious man, in the full possession of his faeilities
would operate or drive under like eonditions, then
the driver is under the influenee of intoxicating
lj_('lJOl''"
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.. If you should find that the plaintiff was under the influence of intoxicating liquor as above
defined and that that constituted negligence on his
part and if that directly or proximately caused or
contributed to the accident and resulting injuries,
then you are instructed you should return a verdict for defendants, even though you should find
that they were also guilty of negligence."
The Court held :
"We think the defendants were entitled to
have said requested instruction or a similar one
given. If plaintiff was driving his car on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he was guilty of negligence per se
(citations given). The requested instruction did
not tell the jury that such negligence, if established, constituted contributory negligence, but
it properly defined intoxication and told the jury
that if it found that plaintiff was guilty of such
negligence, and further found that such negligence
directly and proximately caused or contributed
to the injury, he could not recover. This did not
invade the province of the· jury. It left to the
jury the determination of the vital factors, negligence and proximate cause or contributing cause."
In 'State v. Kendall, 203 N.W. 807 (Iowa), which
was a case involving criminal prosecution for driving
while intoxicated, the facts as stated by the court
were:
"Briefly stated, this case arose under the
following circumstances: About or after midnight on the night of November 19, 1923, the defendant was driving south on Main Street in the
City of Council Bluffs in a Ford automobile. His
car collided with a street car approaching from
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the oppo~ite direction. ~everal witnesses testified again~t the defendant and ~l'Yt>ral testified
for hin1. Son1e of the witne~~e~ on behalf of the
State te~tified the defendant wa~ intoxicated at
the tin1e. Others that he staggered when he attempted to \Yalk: that he used abusive language
toward the n1otonnan and conductor and that they
sinelled intoxicating liquor on his breath. The
undisputed testi1nony shows that after the collision the defendant alighted frmn his car and said,
in addressing the motorman : ·Didn't you see me
con1ing~ \Yhy the hell didn't you turn out~' To
say the least, this inquiry could not come from a
mind that was properly functioning."
The Court held :
·•At most there is a sharp conflict in the testiInony as to whether or not the defendant was intoxicated. It was wholly a question for the jury
and the nisi prius court was right in submitting
it to the jury."
Burgett v. Saginaw Logging Company et al, 85 P 2d
271 ( \V ash.), concerned an accident between a truck being driven in a southerly direction and a bicycle traveling north. Plaintiff, a three year old child, was riding
on the crossbar of the bicycle. The complaint charged
the driver of the truck for driving in excess of the lawful rate of speed and that he was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor to such an extent that he did not have
control of his automobile. Plaintiff received the verdict
below. The evidence of intoxication amounted to a statement by one witness that the truck driver was noticeably
drunk about four and one-half hours prior to the aecident. The court below instructed in substance that vio-
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lation of the statute prohibiting the driving of vehicles
upon public highways while intoxicated is negligence per
se. The court h~ld the instruction was properly given
and said:
"If the condition of intoxication was established then the only remaining question wa~;
whether the existence of that condition was a
proximate cause of the collision. In the instruction to the jury the trial court defined proximate
cause ; the jury was instructed that the burden of
proof is upon the respondent to establish by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that appellant was
negligent in the manner and way alleged by respondent at the time and place of the accident;
and that such negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injuries received by respondent."
The lower court concluded the issue of intoxication
and proximate cause was a jury question. Instruction
No. 5 given by the court in this case reads as follows:
"You are instructed that it is a violation of
the law of this state for any person who is under
the influence of intoxicating liquor to be in actual
physical control of any motor vehicle. 'Under the
influence of intoxicating liquor' means in such
condition from the use of intoxicating liquor so as
to impair the person's ability to drive an automobile in the manner. that an ordinarily prudent
and cautious person in full possession of his
faculties would operate a similar vehicle under
like conditions.
"If you find from a preponderance of evidence in this case that the plaintiff, while driving
his car immediately before and a:t the time of said
accident, was under the influence of intoxicating
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liquor a~ hPrPill!~pfore dt->tint>d, then lw \\'a~ guilty
of negligence as a n1atter of law, and if you find
fr01n a preponderance of the evidence that his condition wa~ the sole or a proximate eontributing
cause of the collision with -defendant's truck, then
plaintiff cannot reeoYer and your verdict nmst he
for the defendant.''

Said instruction is a correct statement of the law
applicable under the eYidence of this case. The instruction merely infor1ns the jury that it is against the laws
of this state to drive an automobile while under "the influence of intoxicating liquor." It then proceeds to define the tern1 "under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
The burden of proving intoxication on part of the plaintiff was placed upon the defendant by the term "if you
find from a preponderance of the evidence in the case."
The court did not instruct the jury that the plaintiff
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor but merely
that if the jury so found then the defendant was guilty
of negligence. Nor did the court instruct the jury that
this negligence precluded a recovery on the part of the
plaintiff unless the jury further found also from "a preponderance of the evidence" that the intoxicated condition was the "sole or a proximate contributing cause of
the collision."
Plaintiff complains of the court's refusal to give
his requested instruction No. 1 to the effect that they
should disregard the evidence in the case pertaining to
the consumption of the beer by plaintiff is being immaterial. Such an instruction on the part of the court
would have constituted a finding by the court that the
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plaintiff was not intoxicated or that his intoxication
was not a proximate or contributing cause of this accident. We have seen this is an issue for the jury which
was properly submitted to the jury by the court in this
case under instruction No. 5.
POINT NO. III
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL BY THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE.

The proposition that evidence is not admissible
because one of the parties does not remember, or chooses
not to remember, which ever the case may be, events
which are probative of the issues to be decided is a novel
one. If such a rule were adopted a party could control
admission of adverse evidence simply by feigning ignorance. The plaintiff in this case had no difficulty remembering those events necessary to make a prima facie
case of negligence against the defendant but very conveniently failed to remember his "drinking activity" in
Cedar City before the accident.
It may be true that evidence which tends to prove
facts which are admitted or are not controverted will
be more likely excluded where, if admitted, it would
probably prejudice and mislead the jury. This rule,
however, has no application to this case for the plain
and simple reason that the intoxication of the plaintiffthe issue to which all of the evidence complained of was
addressed-was not admitted and was controverted or
denied by the plaintiff.
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.. A party eannot he depriYt>d of the hPnefitH
of evidenee which it:' relevant and matPrial lwcant:'e it may alt:'o haYP a tendeney to prejudice the
adYert:'e party in the e~'eS of the jlH~T·" 31 CJS
907, ~ee. 186.
It i~ contended the eYidence of plaintiff's intoxication prior to the accident and after the accident was too ·
remote. \Yhether evidence of intoxication should be
sub1nitted to the jury is not determined by whether that
evidence is exactly in point of time with the collision.
The rule is illustrated by the following cases :
The action of Stuart v. :.MeYey, 87 P 2d -1--!6, (Idaho),
involved the collision of two approaching vehicles. Defendant sought to introduce evidence of plaintiff's intoxication approximately three hours prior to the accident. This was excluded by the trial court. The appellant
court held:
"The evidence sought to be elicited in the instant case referred to a pe-riod of time during the
afternoon and up until 6 :00 in the evening of the
day of the collision, a period ending about three
hours previous to the collision. There would seem
to be no room for argument that evidence of the
drinking intoxicating liquors and the condition of
a person with reference to intoxication is adinissible upon the question of intoxication, if such
evidence is not too remote in point of time, the
fact of remoteness in point of time going rather
to the weight of the evidence, than to its admissibility, and evidence remote in point of time to
the extent of 8 to 10 hours has been held properly
admissible. Cases cited from Philadelphia, Oklahoma, Texas, Massachusetts, California, Iowa,
~fissouri, and New Mexico.
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"The evidence sought to be elicited was admissible, not appearing to be too re1note."
In Maier v. Minidoka County, 105 P 2d 1076 (Idaho),
the evidence sought to be introduced was the odor of
alcohol on the motorist's breath at the hospital two and
one-half hours after the accident. It was contended that
inasmuch as the evidence was after the accident in point
of time that Stuart ·v. McVey (supra) would not apply.
The court held that evidence of intoxication after the
accident was just as relevant as such evidence before
the accident and its remoteness too, went to the weight
to be given it and not to its admissibility.
In Callahan v. Prewitt, 13 N.W. 2nd 660 (Neb.), the
acciden1t occurred on a bridge between two approaching
vehicles. Evidence that the plaintiff had been drinking
shortly before the accident was admitted. Verdict was
for defendant and plaintiff assigns as heir the admission
of drinking. The court held :
"Assignments 4, 5 6 and 7 relate to the use of
intoxicating liquors by Doerfler at a tavern at
about 500 feet west of the Nebraska State Line
in Wyoming immediately before proceeding to the
point where the fatality occurred. The· distance
from the scene of the accident was but a few miles
and the interval between was evidently but a matter of minutes. In the light of the other evidence
this could not be considered evidence of intoxication, but we have no doubt, because of the brief
interval of time and the closeness of this relationship to the accident and the incidents leading to it,
of its admissibility as a circumstance profer to be
considered by the jury in determining whether or
not Doufler was guilty of negligence which was
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the proximate ('HU~e of tlw <wt·idPnt \\'hieh eont ributed to it."
X or \\'as the testimony about the YPry belligerent,
obstreperous behaYior of the plaintiff and his use of profane language inadn1issible. A seriously injured person
in a nor1nal condition realizing his condition and that
he might die is appreeiatiYe of the help of others and
not resentful. In Lynn v. Stinnette, 31 P 2d 764 (Ore.),
plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed while pushing
a bicycle on the side of a road. There was evidence introduced of the consumption of alcohol beverage by the decedent and his conduct shortly before the accident. The
court said:
"Evidence that the decedent, while at nits.
Cmnpbell's house, talked in a loud voice was relevant as tending to show what, if any, effect the
beer had on him. It is common knowledge that
intoxicating liquor has varying effects on different individuals. Some it impells to boisterousness
and loud talking: others, to quarrelsomeness and
sullenness."
Jones v. State, 92 S.W. 2nd 246 (Texas) involved a
prosecution for driving while intoxicated. At the hospital appellant became violently loud and obscene in his
talk, so much so that the sheriff was called. He testified
that the appellant was drunk. Another witness who saw
him a short time before the wreck also testified that frmn
appellant's conduct" and talk he thought appellant was
intoxicated. The court said:
"Appellant brings forward a complaint because the court, over the objection, permitted the
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sheriff to testify that when he saw appellant at
the hospital and that appellant was drunk, the objection being that it was an hour or an hour and
a half after the wreck before the sheriff saw appellant, and that the doctor had given him two
or three strong hypodermics, in connection with
which he had probably used denatured alcohol.
The court was not in error in admitting the
sheriff's testimony. The objections went to the
weight and not the admissibility of the evidence."
And so in the case at bar, it is submitted that the
evidence of plaintiff's conduct before the accident, at
the scene of the accident and in the Cedar City Hospital was admissible even though it might have had a
tendency to prejudice the plaintiff in the eyes of the jury.
The evidence was neither too remote or extraneous to
the issue of the intoxication but had a definite bearing
on the question of the negligence of the plaintiff. It was
proper for the court to admit that evidence for the jury's
consideration in their determination of that question.

POINT NO. IV
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF THE EVIDENCE.

It is true that a party to a lawsuit is entitled to
have his theory of the evrdence submitted to the jury
to the extent that his theory. is supported by the evidence and pleadings in the case. While this is true, this
does not mean tha:t the court must give the exact instruction requested by the plaintiff; that the court must follow the exact language . of the requested instruction;
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or give an instruction which is not supported by the
eYidence, is confusing, or does not correctly state the
law applicable to the case. In Toone v. O'Neill Construction Company, -10 P tah :2(i5, 1:21 P. 10, cited on
page 36 of plaintiff's brief, the appellant c01nplains of
the court's refusal to give a certain instruction. The
court said on page :2S3 of the Utah Report:
.. "\Yithout ·now passing upon the question of
whether the foregoing instruction was too broad
in view of the evidence, we concede that a party
is entitled to have his case subn1itted to the jury
upon the theory of his evidence as well as upon
the theory of the whole evidence. One way the
court n1ight have followed in charging the jury
would have been to charge them in separate
instructions, first in accordance with respondent's
evidence; and, second, in accordance with appellants' evidence which re'la:ted to the proposition
covered by the instruction in question, and each
instruction have directed the jury to return a
verdict in accordance with their findings upon
that question. The court was not bound to charge
the jury in separate instructions, but could cover
the question in one without offending against
appellant's right.
Appellant's theory of the evidence was sufficiently covered by what the court· told the jury
and hence it was not prejudiced by the court's
modification referred to.
In Miller v. Utah Consolidated Mining Co., et al.,
53 Utah 366, 178
771, the court said at page 378 of the
·Utah Reports:
"The defendant was entitled to have its
theory of the case submitted to the jury upon

P:
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proper instructions so long as the theory was
based on some substantial testimony, not necessarily by separate instructions, but by instructions covering the question involving both tlie
plaintiff's and the defendant's theories. From
the foregoing instructions given by the trial court
it is obvious that this is not only what the trial
court attempted, but substantially did as fully
and fairly as it might have done by the giving
of the request denied the defendant."
In Platt v. Utah Light and Traction Company, 57
Utah 7, 169 P. 868 the court in reviewing instructions
which in its opinion should have been given on page 13
of the Utah Reports says :
"Had the court given either of the instructions as requested or in substance and effect,
we would be inclined to hold that the issue presented by the defendant's answer was sufficiently
called to the attention of the jury, and its findings on that particular issue sufficiently determined."
As was said in Potts v. Armour and Co., 39 Atlantic
2d 552 (Md.):
"Trial court may instruct jury upon the law
of the case either by granting requested instructions or by instructions of its own on particular
issues, or on the case as a whole, or by several
or all of such methods."
The test is not whether the court gave the instructions requested by the defendant but whether the court
properly instructed the jury upon the theory of plaintiff's case in those instances where a request was made
and the evidence warranted the giving of an instruction.
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Plaintiff complains of the court's refusal to give
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 3 which reads as
follows:
"You are instructed that vou must disregard
the evidence in this case pert~ining to the drinking of beer by the plaintiff prior to the tiine of
the accident involved in this matter, if you shall
find and believe from a fair. preponderance of
the evidence that such drinking of beer by the
plaintiff did not so impair his physical and mental faculties as to constitute a proximate or contributing cause to the collision."
The requested instruction was not supported by the
evidence, was confusing, and did not accurately or correctly state the law applicable to the evidence in this
case. The instruction assumes that the plaintiff's condition of intoxication was induced by the consumption
of beer. While the evidence shows that the. plaintiff
was intoxicated, there is no evidence in the record· that
this state was induced by the consumption of beer.. The
instruction is confusing in that the jury is instructed
that it must disregard the evidence pertaining to drinking before they are told the condition under which they
should disregard this evidence. A much more logical
sequence would be to first state. the condition and then
what it might do if it found that condition to exist.
The instruction was obviously intended to cover the
question of intoxication, but does not legally define
intoxication nor instruct the jury on the defendant's
burden to prove intoxication by a ·preponderance of the
evidence.
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As has been pointed out previously, the court's
instruction No. 5 was a correct instruction of the law
applicable to the evidence in this case. In that instruction the court defined the term "under the influence of
intoxicating liquor," informed the jury that it required
a preponderance of the evidence to find that the plaintiff
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and further informed the jury that it must also find from a
preponderance of the evidence that his condition was a
sole or proximate contributing cause of the collision in
order to deny plaintiff's recovery on this gr:ound.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant drove his car onto the wrong side of the highway.
The only assertion of negligence on defendant's part was
the evidence of the plaintiff that the defendant's automobile overlapped the center of the highway as it
approached the point of impact (R. 60). There is no
evidence that the defendant did not observe plaintiff's
automobile that is, failed to keep a proper lookout, likewise there is no evidence that the defendant had an
opportunity to alter the course of his automobile. Plaintiff testified he turned in or toward the west just before
entering the bridge. Defendant's driver said the lights
of plaintiff's car seemed to come toward his truck after
the cab of the truck had passed the Ford automobile.
The two cars were approaching each other at an extremely high closing speed, probably in excess of 100
miles per hour. Under either party's evidence, defendant's driver would not have sufficient time to react to the
danger of the collision soon enough to make any attempt
to avoid it.
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Thus it it' seen that in his reqne~ted instruction No.
ti, plaintiff sought to enlarge the issue of defendant's
negligence in a 1nanner whieh "·a~ not supported h~- any
of the evidence in the ea~e.
In its instruction No. 1, the court instructed the
jury in part as follows :
HPlainti:ff contends that the defendant company "·as negligent in the operation of the truck
in that the driver of the truck was then and there
operating said truck upon the east portion of
the said highway while driving south, and that
such act constituted negligence on the part of
the defendant and occasioned the injuries and ·
damages allegedly suffered."
In instruction No. 3, the (>ourt instructed the jury
in part as follows:

"In this regard you are instructed that it is
the duty of anyone operating a 1notor vehicle
on the highway of this sta;te to drive such motor
vehicle upon the right hand side of the road,
particularly when another vehiele is approaching
from the opposite direction.
If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant at the time
and point of the collision with plaintiff's automobile and immediately prior thereto was operating its truck to the left of the mid-point of the
highway, then you are instructed that the defendant was negligent; and if you further find
from a preponderance of the evidence that such
negligence proximately caused injuries and damages to the plaintiff, then you are instructed that
you should return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and award damages
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to the plaintiff as in these instructions set forth,
unless you further find tha;t the negligence of the
plaintiff, if any, contributed to cause his injuries
as in these instructions set forth."
It is submitted that the court did not err in denying
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 6 and that the court
properly and adequately instructed the jury upon the
plaintiff's theory of the evidence, that is, the manner
in which the defendant may have been negligent, in the
court's instructions No. 1 and 3.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion it appears that the jury after a fair
and impartial trial in which no improper prejudicial
evidence was admitted and after having been properly
instructed upon the plaintiff's theory of the evidence
as well as upon the theory of the whole evidence, decided the issues of this case in favor of the defendant.
Not only is there sufficient evidence from which the
jury might have reasonably so determined the issues
of this case, but their judgment is overwhelmingly sustained by the preponderance of the evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Defendwnts
and Respondents
EDWIN B. CANNON
REX J. HANSON
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR.
DON J. HANSON
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